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Recently, position-based quantum cryptography has been claimed to be unconditionally secure.
On the contrary, here we show that the existing proposals for position-based quantum cryptography
are, in fact, insecure if entanglement is shared among two adversaries. Specifically, we demonstrate
how the adversaries can incorporate ideas of quantum teleportation and quantum secret sharing to
compromise the security with certainty. The common flaw to all current protocols is that the Pauli
operators always map a codeword to a codeword (up to an irrelevant overall phase). We propose a
modified scheme lacking this property in which the same cheating strategy used to undermine the
previous protocols can succeed with a rate at most 85%. We conjecture that the modified protocol
is unconditionally secure and prove this to be true when the shared quantum resource between the
adversaries is a two- or three- level system.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography has both power and limita-
tions. Whereas quantum cryptography can offer uncon-
ditional security [1–3] in communications through quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [4, 5] and secure multi-party
computations through quantum secret sharing [6, 7], it
cannot protect private information in secure two-party
computations due to standard no-go theorems in quan-
tum bit commitment [8, 9] and quantum oblivious trans-
fer [10]. So, what is the boundary to the power of quan-
tum cryptography?
To answer the above question, there has been much
research interest in the subject of quantum coin flipping.
See, for example, [11] and references cited therein. In
this paper, we focus on another proposed application of
quantum cryptography. It is called position-based cryp-
tography (PBC) [12]. The goal of position-based cryp-
tography is for a prover to prove to a set of cooperating
spatially separated verifiers that he is at (or in the small
neighborhood of) a particular spatial location.
Why is position-based cryptography interesting? In
everyday life, we tend place trust on spatial locations.
For instance, when we go to a branch of a bank to de-
posit some money, we seldom ask a teller to show his/her
identity to us to prove that he/she is indeed a bank em-
ployee, rather than someone faking as one. Why? This
is because, for instance we went to the branch yesterday
and knew where it was and so, the fact that a person
is today standing in a particular location in a branch of
a bank convinces us that he/she should be trusted as a
bank employee.
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Position-based cryptography might also be of practical
interest in, for example, automatic road tolling in vehic-
ular communication systems [13]. Instead of collecting
road tolls manually or installing many automatic collec-
tion stations in each highway entrance and exit, it would
be nice to use, for example, satellites to track all vehicles
in a highway and charge them road tolls automatically,
according to the paths taken. For such a road toll system
to be fool-proof, it is important to ensure that a cheater
cannot fool the verifiers of his whereabout.
Unfortunately, in the classical world, unconditionally
secure position-based cryptography has been proven to
be impossible [12, 14]. The reason is that classical mes-
sage can be cloned by cheaters perfectly who can resend a
copy to the authorized receiver. So, both senders and re-
ceivers cannot detect an intercept-and-broadcast attack.
Quantum cryptography has a fundamental advantage
over classical cryptography due to the quantum no-
cloning theorem [15, 16]. In view of the success in quan-
tum key distribution, it is an interesting question to ask
whether PBC can be implemented with unconditionally
security under quantum setting. As far as we know,
the possibility of position-based quantum cryptography
(PBQC) was first studied by Kent under the name of
‘quantum tagging’ as early as 2002. Based on the idea,
a patent of quantum tagging system introduced by Kent
et al. was granted in 2006 [17]. However, their results
have not appeared in the academic literature until 2010
[18]. Recently, before the appearance of [18], two PBQC
protocols have been independently proposed by Chan-
dran et al. [14] (hereafter denoted as Protocol A), and
Malaney [19, 20] (hereafter denoted as Protocol B). Pro-
tocol A is claimed to be unconditionally secure with a
detailed proof of security based on complementary infor-
mation tradeoff argument. Protocol B is also claimed to
be unconditionally secure due to the quantum no-cloning
theorem, but no detailed security proof has been given.
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protocols are, in fact, insecure. Cheaters can make use of
entanglement to conduct non-local operations to produce
the same response as the honest case. Independent of our
present work, Kent, Munro, and Spiller [18] have dis-
cussed some conditions required for a secure PBQC pro-
tocol. They address that several types of PBQC scheme
are insecure against teleportation-based attacks. They
outline attacks if the locations of reference stations and
authorized receiver are collinear. Their attack applies to
Protocols A and B for the case of one spatial dimension.
There are two objectives in this paper. First, we show
how existing PBQC protocols (Protocols A and B) can
be cheated by using entangled resources, and discuss why
the protocols are insecure. We discuss not only the case of
one spatial dimension, but also higher dimensions. Sec-
ond, knowing the reasons, we propose a modified proto-
col and discuss its security. Our paper is organized as
follows. In Section II, we outline the procedure of both
Protocol A and Protocol B. In the following Section III,
we consider the case where the number of reference sta-
tions N = 2. Similar to [18] but, more explicitly and
in a step-by-step manner, we show how the protocols
can be cheated with certainty. In Section IV, we con-
sider the cases where N > 2, which can be cheated by
techniques of quantum secret sharing and cluster state
quantum computation. The reason of the insecurity of
both protocols and the loophole of the claimed security
proof are discussed in Section V. In Section VI, we give
our modified protocol and examine its security under our
cheating scheme. Our protocol is proved to be secure in
Section VII if cheaters share entangled qubits or qutrits
only. Finally we summarize our paper in Section VIII
with brief discussions.
II. PBQC PROTOCOLS
Here, for simplicity, we assume that all honest parties
have synchronized clocks and work with flat Minkowski
space-time in special relativity. The idea of position-
based quantum cryptography is to divide encoded quan-
tum information into several parts (but possibly entan-
gled) and distribute to N reference stations V1, . . . , VN at
various separated locations. The divided pieces are then
sent from different directions to an authorized receiver P ,
who is located at a pre-assumed position ~xP surrounding
by a finite secure region that no cheaters can get into.
The interval of sending is well chosen in such a way that
~xP is the unique position where the shortest traveling
time is needed for all pieces of information to come to-
gether. For simplicity, we hereafter assume ~xP locates
at midway between reference stations (or equidistance
position in higher dimension scenario) and the divided
information are sent simultaneously. Measurement is im-
mediately conducted by P on the quantum system, and
the result is broadcasted for verification. The intuition
is as follows. Since perfect quantum measurement (ac-
quire complete status about quantum particle) can only
be achieved with adequate knowledge about the system,
such as the correct basis of quantum state, cheaters out-
side ~xP ought to wait for a longer time for enough in-
formation to conduct perfect measurement. Otherwise,
they are only able to conduct imperfect measurements.
Therefore, references can authenticate receiver’s position
by checking the response time and error rate of broad-
casted measurement results. Procedures of two existing
proposals are outlined as follows.
A. Protocol A
The idea of Protocol A is to send the basis of mea-
surement and the encoded qubit separately from differ-
ent reference stations [14]. Security of this protocol was
supposed to rely on the idea that quantum system can be
measured perfectly only if the correct measurement basis
is obtained. Explicit procedures of Protocol A follows.
Step 1. Station V1 encodes a message u ∈ {0, 1} as a
qubit |u〉, where |0〉 and |1〉 are +1 and −1 eigenstates
of Pauli Z operator respectively. Inspired by the well-
known BB84 QKD protocol, V1 encrypts the message by
applying the transformation Hq on the qubit, where H
is the Hadamard gate, q is a random bit valued 0 or 1.
Step 2. V1 generates N − 2 random bits
q2, q3, . . . , qN−1, and decide a bit qN by the relation
q = q2 + q3 + · · ·+ qN mod 2 . (1)
The bits q2, q3, . . . , qN are distributed to the reference
stations V2, . . . , VN respectively. The encoded message u
is also sent to other stations. We assume the communi-
cation between reference stations are secure, for example
QKD system is employed.
Step 3. The reference stations V1, . . . , VN agree a time
t0 when the PBQC scheme starts. At t = t0, V1 sends
the encoded qubit to P , while Vi sends the classical bit
qi for i = 2, 3, . . . , N .
Step 4. Upon receiving all information, P adds up all
bits to obtain q. The qubit can be decrypted by apply-
ing Hq, and measured in Z basis to obtain the encoded
message. P broadcasts the results immediately to all
reference stations. We assume all operations of P costs
negligible time.
Step 5. If q’s are random enough, missing any one clas-
sical bit would cause half chance of wrong measurement
basis. Reference stations can validate the identity of P
by checking if the response is consistent with the encoded
message. By checking the arrival time of the response at
different reference stations, location of P is also verified.
B. Protocol B
The idea of Protocol B [19] is to encode information
into maximally entangled states and then encrypted by
3local transformation. Information about transformations
are sent from different reference stations. Security of this
protocol was supposed to rely on the fact that correct
measurement cannot be conducted without decrypting
all qubits, as well as the idea that local measurement
must disturb an entangled state. Explicit procedure of
Protocol B follows.
Step 1. N bits of message is encoded as a N qubit
GHZ state
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|a1〉|a2〉 . . . |aN 〉
±|1⊕ a1〉|1⊕ a2〉 . . . |1⊕ aN 〉) , (2)
where a1, . . . , aN ∈ {1, 0}; ⊕ denotes addition with mod-
ular 2. Each reference station picks a qubit from the
entangled state.
Step 2. Each qubit is encrypted by local transforma-
tion Ui and sent to an authorized receiver P . P will store
the entangled state in his quantum memory.
Step 3. PBQC scheme starts at an agreed time t = t0.
Every reference stations send the classical information
about the transformation Ui to P at the same time.
Step 4. P immediately decrypts the state after re-
ceiving the classical information. He then conducts a N
qubit GHZ state measurement to decode the message,
and announces his result at once.
Step 5. The measurement result is probably wrong
if someone measures the state before getting all trans-
formation information. Hence the identity of P can be
authenticated from the announced result. Besides, the
location of P can be verified by the checking the total
time spent in the whole process.
C. Dimensionality of PBQC scheme
In general, the reference stations lie on a one dimen-
sional straight line for N = 2; a two dimensional plane
for N = 3; and they distribute in the three dimensional
space for N > 3. We comment that the dimension of
position of P that can be verified by PBQC scheme, is
independent of the spatial dimension of reference station
distribution. For example, even if there are two reference
stations and they are collinear with P , all three compo-
nents of ~xp = (xp, yp, zp) can be authenticated by PBQC
scheme. To illustrate this idea, assume V1 and V2 are ly-
ing on the x-axis, and ~xp is some point in between. The
signals are sent at time according to PBQC protocols. It
is easy to see that any position with y 6= 0 or z 6= 0 takes
a longer time than P to receive both information from
V1 and V2. Thus the one dimensional PBQC actually
confirms the three dimensional position of P , instead of
the x-coordinate only. Similarly, if P locates at the same
plane as three reference stations V1, V2, V3, the PBQC
scheme also verifies the three dimensional position of P .
This argument however requires the position of reference
stations are well chosen, i.e. V1, V2, P are collinear or
V1
V2
V3
P
P2
FIG. 1: At a particular time t1, front of signals sent from
V1, V2, V3 are represented by solid, dashed, short-dashed lines
respectively. While signals reach P at t = t1, another position
P2 inside the triangle of three reference positions (framed by
dotted lines) can obtain all information before t1.
V1, V2, V3, P are coplanar. Four reference stations are
necessary if their locations are constrained.
We also note that PBQC can be performed if and only
if there exist a polyhedron formed by positions of some
reference stations inside which P locates. Otherwise for
all starting time chosen by the reference stations, there
must be places inside the polyhedron such that shorter
or equal time is required to receive all information. The
idea is illustrated on Fig. 1.
III. CHEATING IN THE N = 2 CASE
Contrary to claim(s) of unconditional security, we find
that both Protocols A and B are, in fact, insecure. We
first demonstrate our cheating strategy for two-reference-
stations case (i.e. N = 2) for both protocols, and gener-
alize it to the more-reference-stations case (i.e., N > 2)
in the next section. In the current case, we assume V1
and V2 are separated by distance 2d and P locates in the
middle of two reference stations, so that they lie on a
one-dimensional straight line. PBQC requires P is sur-
rounded by a finite restricted area, such as inside a big
military base, with width 2l that no cheaters can get into
it. We assume either qubit or classical information are
transmitted at the speed of light c, and the time for in-
termediate processing is negligible. If the PBQC scheme
starts at t = 0, V1 and V2 expect to get the correct re-
sponse at t = 2d/c.
A successful cheating is to produce the correct response
not slower than t = 2d/c without entering the restricted
area. We find that two cheaters are enough to cheat the
protocols in this case. We assume cheaters B1 and B2 are
sitting at d− l and d+ l respectively, which are both just
outside the restricted area. The layout of our scenario is
shown in Fig. 2.
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FIG. 2: Spacetime diagram of the one dimensional scenario.
Solid lines denote spacetime trajectory of information which is
possibly quantum or classical, while double lines denote that
of classical information only. In both Protocols A and B, all
measurements ought to be conducted at t = (d− l)/c (shown
as squares) in order to give correct response to reference po-
sitions on the expected time t = 2d/c. Appropriate response
is decided after information of another cheater is received at
t = (d + l)/c (shown as circles). If there is no entangled re-
sources shared, B1 has to wait for information from V2 to
conduct perfect measurement. Trajectory of the correspond-
ing response is represented by dot-dashed line, which shows
the correct result cannot reach V2 before t = 2d/c.
A. Flaw in claimed security proof
We remark that Protocol A was once believed to be
unconditional secure. In fact, a detailed claim of proof
of security based on complementary information trade-
off was given in [14]. The intuition behind the claimed
proof is that the any measurement on the encrypted qubit
would inevitably disturb the state and hence yield wrong
outcome with non-zero probability.
Unfortunately, in the security proof of Protocol A [14],
it was implicitly assumed that no prior entanglement is
shared by the cheaters. Indeed, a pure state is assumed
for the state consisting of only one cheater and one honest
party. See, for example, in the first sentence of the last
paragraph of p. 8 of the quant-ph version 1 [14].
We remark that such an assumption is incorrect. In
fact, the cheaters can easily nullify the security proof by
using shared entanglement. We note that with shared
entangled resources, quantum teleportation can be con-
ducted by measuring the qubit appropriately [21]. The
main idea of our cheating scheme in the N = 2 case is
to teleport the encrypted qubit from B1 to B2 for mea-
surement in the correct basis. Detailed cheating strategy
procedure is as follows.
X
Z
FIG. 3: Circuit for teleporting an unknown qubit |ψ〉 [21, 22].
Measurement is denoted as squares, the measurement basis
is represented by the character inside the squares. UΣ =
X(1−s2)/2Z(1−s1)/2 is the byproduct of teleportation depend-
ing on random measurement outcome s1 and s2.
B. Cheating against Protocol A in the N = 2 case
Step 1.Before the cheaters move to the destination,
they come together and each pick a particle from a Bell
state
|Φ00〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉) . (3)
We assume their quantum memory is perfect that the
qubits remain in coherence until measurement.
Step 2. When the PBQC scheme starts t = 0, V1
sends a qubit Hq|u〉, and V2 sends the bit q2 = q to P .
At t = (d− l)/c, B1 captures the qubit and B2 obtain the
basis information. To avoid suspicion of P , the cheaters
can send dummy qubit and basis information to him,
and P ’s response thereafter is interfered or blocked by
classical devices. We hereafter neglect the role of P in
our consideration.
Step 3. B1 immediately perform a Bell measurement
on this two qubits in order to teleport the state to B2, the
circuit of his measurement is given in Fig. 3. He sends
the measurement outcomes of the encrypted qubit, s1,
and Bell state qubit, s2, to B2 at once. We note that
measurement outcomes of Pauli operators are +1 or −1.
Step 4.At the same instance t = (d − l)/c, the tele-
ported qubit of B2 becomes
X(1−s2)/2Z(1−s1)/2Hq|u〉 . (4)
Consider if q = 0, B2 has a state
X(1−s2)/2Z(1−s1)/2|u〉 = (−1)u(1−s1)/2|u⊕ (1− s2)/2〉 .
(5)
Since B2 knows the basis is Z, and the state in Eq. (5)
is an eigenstate of Pauli Z operator, he can conduct a
perfect measurement with outcome (−1)us2. Else if q =
0, B2 has a state
HZ(1−s2)/2X(1−s1)/2|u〉
= (−1)[u⊕(1−s1)/2](1−s2)/2H |u⊕ (1− s1)/2〉 . (6)
Since B2 knows the basis is X , and the state in Eq. (6)
is an eigenstate of Pauli X operator, he can conduct a
perfect measurement with outcome (−1)us1.
5B2 immediately sends the result to B1. It is re-
minded that although the measurement outcome of B2
contains information about outcome of B1 our telepor-
tation scheme does not permit superluminal communica-
tion because B1 cannot choose the measurement result
deterministically.
Step 5. Then at t = (d + l)/c, both B1 and B2 knows
the result from each other, as well as the correct measure-
ment basis. They can invert the value of u by multiplying
outcome of B2 with second outcome of B1 for q = 0, or
multiplying outcome of B2 with first outcome of B1 for
q = 0. B1 then sends u to V1 while B2 sends to V2,
both reference stations will receive the correct signal at
t = 2d/c.
The whole process consumes the same amount of time
to produce the same correct result as there is no cheaters,
Protocol A is therefore insecure in 1-D.
Remark: Let us explain the intuition in Step 3 (the
teleportation step). The teleported state received by B2
will be acted upon by one of the four operators, I,X, Z
and XZ. Since the original state is an eigenstate of ei-
ther X and Z, we note that the four resulting states are
either orthogonal to each other or the same (up to an
irrelevant overall phase). Therefore, B2 with the basis
information can simply measure the qubit in that basis
without disturbing the state at all. Subsequently, after
hearing the actual Bell measurement outcome by B1, B2
will be able to tell what the original state is. For this
reason, B1 and B2 can cheat successfully with certainty.
Therefore, Protocol A is insecure.
Remark: Let us explain the intuition from another an-
gle. Since the measurements by B1 and B2 commute with
each other, we can also interpret the result from the view-
point where B2 performs a measurement before B1 does.
In this case, B2, with the basis information will measure
a qubit in the correct basis. By the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen effect, the qubit held by B1 will be projected to
either the same state or the opposite state to the qubit
sent by V1. So, the task of B1 is to perform a parity
check of the states of the two qubits. While a general
parity check is impossible for all bases, we note that in
Protocol A, we consider only the two bases X and Z.
So, in this case, as the operator XX commutes with ZZ,
indeed B1 can perform a parity check by simply doing a
Bell measurement. For this reason, B1 and B2 can cheat
successfully with certainty.
C. Cheating against Protocol B in the N = 2 case
In the current case, 2 bits of information, ab =
{00, 01, 10, 11}, can be encoded into one of the four Bell
states |Φab〉 [19] in Eq. (3) and
|Φ01〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) = 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉) (7)
|Φ10〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉 − | − −〉) (8)
|Φ11〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) = −1√
2
(|+−〉 − | −+〉). (9)
The qubits are then encrypted by random local transfor-
mation U1 and U2 and sent to P . The PBQC scheme
starts at t = 0 when reference stations broadcast Ui,
and is expected to end at t = 2d/c in the honest case.
The idea of the cheating is to first capture and store the
qubits until decryption information. One of the cheater
is then teleport the qubit so the other cheater possess
two entangled qubit to do Bell measurement. Step by
step procedure is as follows.
Step 1. Before the process, the cheaters share a Bell
state in Eq. (3) and store it in good quantum memory.
Step 2. The cheaters break into the quantum channels
connecting P with reference stations, they capture the
qubits sent by V1 and V2 in a good quantum memory to
preserve the coherence until measurement.
Step 3. At t = (d − l)/c, both cheaters receive the Ui
form references, U †i is applied respectively on the qubits
to recover the encoded state |Φab〉
Step 4. B2 teleports the incoming qubit to B1. We
call the encoded state qubit captured by B1(B2) as qubit
1(2), and the Bell state qubit of B1(B2) as qubit 4(3).
We analyze the teleportation by stabilizer formalism [23]
as follows. B2 apply a CNOT gate on his qubits, the
state is then stabilized by
K1 = (−1)aZ1Z2 , K2 = (−1)bX1X2X3,
K4 = Z2Z3Z4 , K3 = X3X4 . (10)
Qubits 2 is then measured in X basis and qubit 3 is mea-
sured in Z basis. The outcomes s2 and s3 are sent to B1
immediately. New set of stabilizers after the measure-
ment is
K ′1 = (−1)as3Z1Z4 , K ′2 = (−1)bs2X1X4,
K ′3 = s3Z3 , K
′
4 = s2X2 . (11)
Qubit 2 and 3 are obviously no longer entangled as they
are measured. K ′1 and K
′
2 show that qubit 1 and 4 are
left as a Bell state |Φa′b′〉, where a′ = a+ (1− s3)/2 and
b′ = b+(1−s2)/2. So B1 can measure the state perfectly
by Bell measurement, the outcomes a′ and b′ are sent to
B2 immediately.
Step 5. At t = (d + l)/c, both cheaters obtain infor-
mation from each others. a and b are deduced from a′,
b′, s2 and s3, they are sent to and eventually received by
reference stations at t = 2d/c. Hence correct results are
extracted by cheaters using the same time as in honest
case, PBQC is hacked.
6d
l
V1
V2V3
B2
B1
B3
P
FIG. 4: Positions of reference stations, cheaters, and autho-
rized receiver of our three station scenario are shown as black
dots. The shaded region represents the restricted area sur-
rounding P . Without the cheating, information flows along
solid lines; if cheating presents, information flows along solid
lines outside the restricted area, and follows dotted lines in
the restricted area. As the path of V2 → P → V1 is longer
than V2 → B2 → B1 → V1, process of cheating costs shorter
time than the honest case.
IV. CHEATING IN N > 2 CASE
We first consider the N = 3 case which the reference
stations lie on the same plane, and then discuss how
the scheme can be generalized to three dimensional cases
with N > 3. For simplicity, we assume the three refer-
ence stations V1, V2, V3 locate at vertex of an equilateral
triangle. The receiver P sits in the center of the triangle,
which is distance d from each references, and surrounded
by a restricted area with radius l. We find that three
cheaters are enough to cheat both protocol perfectly. We
assume cheaters B1, B2, B3 locate at distance l from P
and d − l from V1, V2, V3 respectively. A layout of their
position is shown as Fig. 4.
A. Cheating against Protocol A in N > 2 case
In this protocol, V1 encrypted the encoded state in
Hq|u〉 and distribute q2 and q3 to V2 and V3. The phys-
ical meaning of q2 and q3 are number of H gate, such
that progressively applying Hq2Hq3 is equal to Hq. In
this case, the cheaters are not going to teleport the qubit
as there is only one qubit but two separate piece of infor-
mation. Instead they need methods to share the rotation
information, so quantum secret sharing scheme is em-
ployed [6, 7]. Steps of the cheating scheme is as follows.
Step 1. Before the PBQC scheme starts, the cheaters
construct a 3-particle GHZ state
1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) . (12)
They then travel to the desired position before the PBQC
starts at t = 0.
TABLE I: Tables of stabilizers in different cases of qi’s. K1 is
the stabilizer of GHZ state compatible with the measurement
basis. K′′1 , K
′′
2 , and K
′′
3 are stabilizers after the measurement
according to the cheating scheme.
q2 q3 K1 K
′′
2 K
′′
3 K
′′
1
0 0 X1X2X3 s2X2 s3X3 s2s3X1
0 1 −Y1X2Y3 s2X2 s3Y3 −s2s3Y1
1 0 −Y1Y2X3 s2Y2 s3X3 −s2s3Y1
1 1 −X1Y2Y3 s2Y2 s3Y3 −s2s3X1
Step 2. At t = (d − l)/c, B2 and B3 gets q2 and q3.
If qi = 0, cheater Bi measures his qubit in X basis; oth-
erwise he measures in Y basis. According to the idea of
quantum secret sharing, if both B2 and B3 measure in
the same basis, the GHZ qubit holding by B1 becomes an
eigenstate of Pauli X operator, otherwise it is eigenstate
of Y operator. As an example, let us consider the case
q2 = 0 and q3 = 1. It can be shown that the GHZ states
before measurement is stabilized by
K1 = −Y1X2Y3, K2 = Z1Z2, K3 = Z1Z3 . (13)
Entanglement is broken after measurement, and the sta-
bilizers then become single particle operators. It can
be easily obtained that B1’s qubit is then stabilized by
−s2s3Y , where s2 and s3 are measurement outcomes of
B2 and B3. Results of other combination of q’s are pre-
sented in Table I .
Step 3. Immediately after the measurement, B1 applies
a Hadamard transformation H followed by a π/4 gate
S on the GHZ state qubit, in order to transform the
eigenstates of X to that of Z, and eigenstates of Y to
that of X , with the same eigenvalues. Now it can be
observed that if q2 + q3 is even, B1 will have a qubit
in Z basis, otherwise he will have a qubit in X basis.
At the the same time t = (d − l)/c, B1 also receives the
encoded qubit sent from V1, so he has two qubits on hand
that are parallel or anti-parallel, i.e. the two qubits are
simultaneous eigenstate of either Pauli X or Z operator.
B1 performs Bell measurement and gets one of the four
outcomes in Eq. (3) and (7)-(9).
Step 4. The cheaters share their measurement outcome
and basis information with others. Since the mutual dis-
tance between B1, B2 and B3 is
√
3l, the cheaters can
obtain all the information at t = (d+(
√
3−1)l)/c. From
information of B2 and B3, the actual state of the cluster
state qubit of B1 is known from Table I. The outcome of
Bell measurement can tell the parity of the two qubits of
B1, the state of the encoded qubit is obtained.
Step 5. Correct result is then sent by the cheaters and
reaches the reference stations at t = (2d+ (
√
3 − 2)l)/c.
When comparing to the case without cheaters that the
whole PBQC process is expected to finish at t = 2d/c,
our cheating scheme eventually requires fewer time to
produce the correct result. Cheaters can simply delay for
a while before broadcasting their final outcomes, in order
7to match the time consumption in honest case. Hence the
protocol is cheated.
We note that the time is shortened because information
takes 2l/c time to travel from B1’s position to B2’s po-
sition in honest case, while only
√
3l/c is needed if there
are cheaters. In general if the geometry is not an equilat-
eral triangle, our cheating scheme may still process faster
than the honest case, provided that P is not on the same
straight line as any two reference stations. It is because
honest information has to be sent from a vertex to the
centre of triangle where P locates, and then rebroadcast
to another vertex, while information of cheaters is trans-
mitted along edges of the triangle.
Our cheating scheme can be generalized to cases with
N > 3 reference stations, we need at most N cheaters in
each case. Before the PBQC starts, the cheaters create
a N particle GHZ state which is stabilized by
K1 = X1X2 . . . XN , Ki = Zi−1Zi , (14)
for i = 2, 3, . . . , N ; subscripts of Pauli operators are order
of remaining qubits. Each cheater Bi picks a qubit and
travels to a position between P and Vi. When B2, . . . , BN
receives the basis information, they measure their qubit
in X basis if qi = 0, or Y basis if qi = 1, and broad-
cast the results. If even number of q’s are equal to 1,
the qubit of B1 is in X basis, otherwise it changes to
eigenstate of Y basis. In the former case, Y measure-
ment must be performed in pairs. Consider qi = 1 at
position m and n, we must be able to construct a stabi-
lizer K ′1 = K1Km+1Km+2 . . .Kn = −X1 . . . Ym . . . Yn . . .
which is compatible to the measurements, such that
the qubit of B1 remains at X basis after the mea-
surement. Otherwise there is one single Y measure-
ment at position r, the compatible stabilizer becomes
K ′1 = K1K2 . . .Kr = −Y1 . . . Yr . . . , and the qubit of B1
has changed to eigenstate of Y basis.
Identical to the N = 3 case, B1 applies an SH gate
onto his cluster state qubit, he then obtains an eigenstate
of X operator if q is odd or an eigenstate of Z operator if
q is even. He then measures the cluster state qubit and
encoded qubit sent from V1 by Bell measurement and
broadcasts the measurement outcome. In the present
case of N > 3, cheaters do not receive all information
at the same time, but it is easy to check that even the
slowest piece of information should arrive as late as in
the honest case. Information provided by B2, . . . , BN
determines the actual state of GHZ state qubit of B1,
and the measurement ofB1 reveals the parity between his
two qubits. Hence the value of encoded qubit is obtained
and cheaters sent the results to reference stations. The
whole process takes fewer time than or the same as the
honest case.
B. Cheating against Protocol B in N > 2 case
In this protocol, 3 bits of information is encoded as one
of the eight tripartite GHZ-type states [19] characterizing
by parameters b1, b2, b3
|Φb1b2b3〉 =
1√
2
(|a1〉|a2〉|a3〉 ± |1⊕ a1〉|1⊕ a2〉|1 ⊕ a3〉) ,
(15)
where a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3 ∈ {0, 1}; (−1)b1 = ±1 is the
phase between two superposition states; b2 = a1⊕a2 and
b3 = a1⊕a3. The quibits are then distributed to reference
stations, we denote the qubit held by Vi as qubit i. Qubit
i is encrypted by arbitrary local transformation Ui, and
sent to P subsequently. The PBQC scheme starts at
t = 0 when reference stations send information of Ui to
P , correct response should return at t = 2d/c. We find
that three cheaters are enough to cheat perfectly in this
case. The idea is the same as in N = 2 case, which is
to teleport all qubits to one cheater, so he can conduct a
N particle GHZ-type state measurement. The cheating
strategy is as follows.
Step 1. Before they have travelled to desire positions,
B2(B1) picks qubit 4 (5), and B3(B1) picks qubit 6(7),
which qubits 4 and 5, 6 and 7 are Bell states in Eq. (3).
Step 2. The cheaters break into the quantum chan-
nel connecting Vi and P and capture the encrypted
qubits. We call the qubit captured by B1 as qubit i.
At t = (d − l)/c, cheaters receive information of Ui and
corresponding decryption procedure is made to obtain
the original encoded state.
Step 3. Immediately after the decryption, B2 and
B3 conducts Bell measurement for teleportation. After-
wards, the state is stabilized by
K ′1 = (−1)b1s2s3X1X5X7,
K ′2 = (−1)b2s4Z1Z5, K ′3 = (−1)b3s6Z1Z7,
K ′4 = s2X2, K
′
5 = s4X4
K ′6 = s3X3, K
′
7 = s6X6 . (16)
It is easy to verify from Eq. (16) that qubits 1, 5, 7 be-
comes a GHZ-type state |Φb′
1
a′
2
a′
3
〉, where b′1 = b1 ⊕ (1 −
s2s3)/2, b
′
2 = b2 ⊕ (1 − s4)/2, b′3 = b3 ⊕ (1 − s5)/2. So
B1 can conduct GHZ state measurement to reveal the
residual state exactly. Result is sent to other cheaters.
Step 4. In our equilateral triangle case, information
exchange among cheaters is finished at t = (d + (
√
3 −
1)l)/c. The encoded message b1, b2, b3 can easily be
inferred from the measuring outcomes. Correct results
are sent to reference stations, and the whole process can
be finished as early as t = (2d + (
√
3 − 2)l)/c, which is
even shorter than the honest case. If the three stations
are not forming an equilateral triangle, the time required
by cheating is longer. But the time consumption is in
general fewer than 2d/c for any 3-station scenario, PBQC
is hence cheated.
8V. PRINCIPLE OF THE CHEATING SCHEMES
A. Protocol A
We have verified that our cheating strategy works not
only for qubits encoded in BB84 states (eigenstates of
X and Z operators), it also works if eigenstates of both
Pauli X , Y , and Z can be chosen for encoding. In the
one-dimensional case, the same cheating scheme can be
applied as described in Section III B. What is the intu-
ition here? An intuition is that the teleported state will
be transformed by one of the four operators I,X, Z, and
XZ. Now, if the input state is an eigenstate of either
X , or Y or Z operator, then the output state will be
either the same or opposite to the input state (up to an
irrelevant overall phase). Another intuition is that a Bell
measurement by B1 allows him to check the parity of
operators, XX , Y Y and ZZ simultaneously as the three
operators commute with each other.
In the case of more than 3 reference stations, the orig-
inal quantum secret sharing idea does not work, because
we need switching between the three basis instead of
two in Protocol A. Cheating can be achieved by clus-
ter state quantum computation (CSQC) [24]. Instead of
a N -particle GHZ state, the cheaters shares a 4N − 3
particles chain cluster state. B1 picks a qubit on the
end of the chain, while other cheaters pick 4 consecutive
qubits from the chain. As stated in [24], each cheater
can conduct general rotation by measuring three qubits
in appropriate direction, while the last qubit is measured
in X basis to teleport the state to next cheater. Finally,
the cluster state qubit of B1 lies in the same basis as the
incoming qubit, and he can conduct Bell measurement as
before. It is noted that all cluster state qubit measure-
ments can be conducted at the same time, sequence of
the measurement among cheaters is unimportant. It is
because all measurement are local operations and obvi-
ously independent to each other. We also note that the
quantum secret sharing and quantum teleportation men-
tioned before are special cases of CSQC. In fact CSQC is
a more general concept, so we will analyze our cheating
scheme under this formalism.
We find that two characteristics of eigenstates in X , Y ,
and Z basis leave the possibility for our cheating. Firstly,
the conversion between them (H is the transformation
between X states and Z states; S is the transformation
between X states and Y states) are in the Clifford group.
Recall in the N = 2 case, we have pulled the H gate from
Eq. (4) to the front in Eq. (6), and let the Pauli operators
applying on the Z states before the gate. Since the basis
of Pauli states are not changed by Pauli operators, the
action of transformation gate is not altered and hence
the teleported state is in the same basis as the original
qubit. In N > 2 cases, we refer to the general rotation
operation of CSQC [24],
|ψout〉 =
N∏
i=2
UΣiUi|ψin〉 , (17)
where |ψout〉 is the cluster state qubit held by B1; |ψin〉
can be treated as |0〉 in our case; Ui is rotation induced
by cluster state measurement, in our case it is performed
by Bi to conduct rotation hinted by the message of Vi;
UΣi = X
iZi is the by product of random measurement
outcome of the i-th qubit. It is transparent that if Ui are
all operators in the Clifford group, Eq. (17) becomes
|ψout〉 = UUΣ|0〉 = eiφU |0 or 1〉 , (18)
where U is the product of all Ui, which is the complete
basis information separated beforehand in this protocol;
USigma is a product of Pauli operators, its form depends
UΣi as well as commutating relation between UΣi and Ui;
eiφ = {±1,±i} is the phase generated by UΣ|0〉, and the
state |0〉 can only flip to |1〉 or remain unchanged upon
UΣ.
The cluster state qubit of B1 is hence parallel or anti-
parallel to the encoded qubit, B1 can obtain information
of the unknown qubit by checking parity of his qubits on
hand, if such parity checking measurement exists. For
eigenstates of Pauli operators, parity of two qubits in the
same basis can be checked by Bell measurement, which
is the second key point to our cheating scheme. We illus-
trate the idea using the BB84 states and leave interested
readers to verify the Y states. If both qubits of B1 are in
Z basis, only |Φ00〉 and |Φ01〉 contains even parity states
and odd parity states appear in |Φ10〉 and |Φ11〉 only;
while if they are in X basis, only |Φ00〉 and |Φ10〉 con-
tains even parity states and odd parity states appear in
|Φ01〉 and |Φ11〉 only. It can be seen that even and par-
ity states do not appear in the same Bell states, hence
cheaters can infer the parity of qubits of B1 by the Bell
measurement result. Furthermore, cheaters know the ex-
act form of cluster state qubit of B1, the qubit is then
revealed by the parity.
B. Protocol B
This protocol is once believed to be secure. The argu-
ment is based on the quantum no-cloning theorem [19].
But it is not necessary to clone the state perfectly in or-
der to conduct a perfect measurement distant apart. The
problem of Protocol B is that the message is encoded in
GHZ states, which each code is related to each other
by single bit flip and overall phase flip only. Since the
random byproduct of our teleportation scheme are single
particle X and Z operators, an encoded state must be
mapped to another code state after teleportation. As a
result, a standard decoding procedure can read out the
teleported state perfectly.
VI. MODIFIED PBQC SCHEME
In Section V, we have discussed Protocol A is insecure
because the qubit is encoded as eigenstates of X or Z,
9such that the basis of state do not change upon teleporta-
tion or cluster state manipulation. And we are able to re-
veal the parity of two particles if they are in X or Z basis.
Notice, however, that if one modifies a protocol to allow
more general bases other than the X , Y and Z bases,
then our cheating strategy does not generally work, in
the sense that B1 may not be able to find an appropriate
basis to measure the teleported qubits perfectly. This is
because the byproduct of random measurement outcomes
of teleportation may map the encoded state into a state
that is no longer a code. In fact, our cheating scheme
fails if references encoded the 2-bit message as the states
{|00〉, (|01〉± |10〉)/√2, |11〉} in the one dimensional case.
It is easy to check that the by products of teleportation
do not necessarily map a code state to a code state. But
if the cheaters are allowed to possess general entangled
resources, is this protocol still secure? We do not have
the answer right now, and leave it as an open question
as our next goal of endeavour.
A natural modification to Protocol A hopefully resis-
tant to the cheating is to encode the message as ±1 eigen-
states of nˆ(θ, φ) · ~σ
|ψ〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉+ sin θ
2
eiφ|1〉 , (19)
|ψ¯〉 = sin θ
2
|0〉 − cos θ
2
eiφ|1〉 , (20)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ π and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 2π, ~σ = Xxˆ + Y yˆ + Zzˆ
is the Pauli vector. Such a modified protocol was also
proposed in [18].
In the one dimensional case, reference stations V1 and
V2 are assumed connecting with a quantum channel,
through which QKD can be conducted. Although only
finite bits can be communicated through QKD, random
θ and φ can be generated by various methods. One ex-
ample is to make use of the universality of quantum com-
putation, that arbitrary qubit can be constructed by se-
quences of Clifford operators plus a π/8 gate [19, 22].
A random sequence of ‘0’ and ‘1’ is generated by V1 and
sent to V2. Each ‘0’ represents an operation of Hadamard
gate H , while a ‘1’ represents an operation of π/8 gate
T , such that the encrypted state is given by HTHTT |u〉,
where u ∈ {0, 1} is the bit to be encoded, for sequence
‘01011’ [19]. Similiarly if there are N reference stations,
each of them are connected to V1 with QKD channels for
communication of arbitrary rotation Ui. The encrypted
qubit sent from V1 to P is U2 . . . UN |u〉, while reference
stations V2 . . . VN send information of rotation Ui.
It is not difficult to check that our modified protocol is
immune to our original cheating strategy demonstrated
in Section III and IV. In the one dimensional case, B1
captures the state |ψ〉 in Eq. (19) sent from V1 at t =
(d − l)/c, and teleported to B2 immediately. Although
B2 knows the basis from V2, it can be shown that the
teleported state can be neither parallel nor anti-parallel
with the original one, i.e. for s1 and s2 not equal to one,
the matrix element
〈ψ|X(1−s2)/2Z(1−s1)/2|ψ〉 6= 0 or 1 . (21)
Therefore B2 cannot find a basis to measure the qubit al-
ways perfectly without knowing measurement outcomes
from B1. Message of B1 arrives B2 as soon as t =
(d+l)/c. Even if B2 measures the qubit immediately, cor-
rect feedback will reach V1 no earlier than t = 2(d+ l)/c
which costs more time than expected. Security of PBQC
is hence enforced.
In the case of more reference stations, rotation Ui’s
do not belong to the Clifford group, it precludes the en-
crypted state to transform from Eq. (17) to Eq. (18). As
in the one dimensional case, B1 cannot perform a per-
fect measurement until the random outcomes of cluster
state measurement are known. But the location where
all information can reach each other in the shortest time
locates inside the restricted area of P , in other words the
cheaters need time than the honest case to get the correct
result. Security of PBQC is hence enforced.
In practice, neither the quantum operations, quantum
channel, nor measurements are noiseless, incorrect re-
sponse can be given even in the honest case. The total
error rate of practical PBQC system ought to be bounded
below the successful cheating rate, i.e. probability of pro-
ducing correct feedback by cheaters on time. Otherwise
failure of cheating may be regarded as error caused by
noise, PBQC scheme hence becomes insecure.
We now discuss the successful cheating rate of our pro-
tocol under various cheating schemes in the one dimen-
sional case. First of all, we consider B1 simply measures
the qubit and announces the result. It is equal to the
average value of |〈0|ψ〉|2 for any θ and φ. The success-
ful rate is obviously 50%, as it is no different from a
random guess. Next, we consider B1 measures the qubit
but announces until obtaining basis information from B2.
The successful rate is 75%. It is more than a random
guess, because for θ < π/2, B1’s measurement outcome
is more probably correct, while it is more probably wrong
if θ > π/2. B1 can announce the inverse of his measure-
ment outcome for θ > π/2 case, successful rate is then
increased. Finally we consider our teleportation cheating
scheme. B2 measures the teleported state in Fig. 3 by
basis states {|ψ〉, |ψ¯〉}. Consider if the result is |ψ〉. Af-
ter knowing s2 and s3, the cheaters announce the more
probably correct result, i.e.
|v〉 = {|ψ〉, |ψ¯〉|max(|〈ψ|X(1−s2)/2Z(1−s1)/2|v〉|2)} .
(22)
The average successful rate is
1
4
∫ [
1 + max(|〈ψ|X |ψ〉|2, |〈ψ|X |ψ¯〉|2)
+max(|〈ψ|Z|ψ〉|2, |〈ψ|Z|ψ¯〉|2)
+max(|〈ψ|XZ|ψ〉|2, |〈ψ|XZ|ψ¯〉|2)
]
dΩ , (23)
which is about 85%. We have checked numerically that
85% is the highest successful rate can be achieved for
any measurement basis is used by B2. In the case of
more reference stations, cluster state quantum compu-
tation requires more measurements. So there are more
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random byproducts and the successful rate is anticipated
to be lower than one dimensional case.
It is noted that Chandran et al. suggests B1 can en-
tangle the encoded qubit with his quantum memory, and
then sends one to B2. Since the quantum systems are
entangled, any measurement of B1 will leave B2 a mixed
state. B1 has to announce a response before knowing
measurement result of B2, otherwise the operation time
must exceed that allowed by PBQC scheme. But mea-
surement outcome of B2 is probabilistic, if B2 makes a
response according to this, there is probability that the
response received by V1 and V2 are inconsistent. This
kind of inconsistency reveals there must be cheaters ly-
ing between, because noisy operation in honest case must
not produce inconsistent results. So either B1 or B2 must
not do any measurement, the cheaters are not benefited
by the quantum memory.
VII. SECURITY OF MODIFIED PROTOCOL
So far we have demonstrated how our modified PBQC
protocol remains secure against the teleportation-based
cheating scheme. It is curious to know whether the proto-
col is secure if other kinds of entangled qubits are shared
among cheaters, and strategy other than teleportation is
employed.
Recalling in the one dimensional case, we first teleport
the unknown encoded state from B1 to B2 for measure-
ment; while in N > 2 case we use secret sharing ideas
to send a share of the basis information to B1 through
cluster state quantum computation, parity of the cluster
state qubit and encoded qubit is then checked. Although
seemingly different cheating strategy is taken in one di-
mensional and N > 2 cases, they are actually the same in
principle. It is because the measurements of cheaters are
local and thus independent on each others. Time order
of the measurement is unimportant, all cheaters conduct
their operation immediately after receiving information
reference stations. It is easy to see that measurement of
cluster state by B2 in the one dimensional case actually
uses secret sharing ideas to send a share of the basis in-
formation to B1, while the entanglement operation and
X basis measurement of B1 is equivalent to some parity
checking procedure.
We first consider the one dimensional case. Suppose a
general 2-qubit entangled state is shared among cheaters,
which would become any set of states containing basis
information after measurements of B2. If the encoded
qubit is in Z basis, we assume w.l.o.g. that B2 makes
an measurement to ‘send’ states |0˜〉 and |1˜〉 to B1. In
general, the states B1 obtained from B2 are
|↑˜〉 = g(θ, φ)|0˜〉+ h(θ, φ)|1˜〉
|↓˜〉 = h∗(θ, φ)|0˜〉 − g∗(θ, φ)|1˜〉 , (24)
where g, h are functions of basis information of B2. Here
we have assumed |↑˜〉 and |↓˜〉 are orthogonal, successful
rate of cheating decreases in non-orthogonal case. It is
noted that the probability for |↑˜〉 or |↓˜〉 to appear equals
to 0.5, otherwise causality is violated. After the mea-
surement, B2 transmits classical information of basis of
encoded qubit, basis of his measurement on the entangled
state, and the measurement outcome to B1.
In the Z-basis case, in order to distinguish |0〉 and |1〉
after obtaining information from B2, B1 conducts a von
Neumann measurement with basis
|M1〉 = α|0〉|0˜〉+ β|1〉|1˜〉, |M2〉 = β∗|0〉|0˜〉 − α∗|1〉|1˜〉
|M3〉 = γ|0〉|1˜〉+ δ|1〉|0˜〉, |M4〉 = δ∗|0〉|1˜〉 − γ∗|1〉|0˜〉 ,
(25)
where the coefficients α, β, γ, δ characterize the measure-
ment. The states are set as above such that every |0˜〉
and |1˜〉 associate with either |0〉 or |1〉. Otherwise if |Mi〉
contains terms like (|0〉 + |1〉)|1˜〉, B1 cannot reveal the
identity of encoded qubit after communicated with B2.
Since B1 knows nothing about the basis, he always
conducts the same measurement in Eq. (25). For general
θ and φ, B1 gets one of the four states
{|ψ〉|↑˜〉, |ψ〉|↓˜〉, |ψ¯〉|↑˜〉, |ψ¯〉|↓˜〉} . (26)
An important observation is that the cheaters are able
to distinguish the encoded qubit, only if every measure-
ment state |Mi〉 contains components of |↑˜〉 and |↓˜〉 as-
sociated with either |ψ〉 or |ψ¯〉 only. This statement can
be reformulated to say that each state in Eq. (26) is a
superposition of at most two states in Eq. (25).
We expand |ψ〉|↑˜〉 as
|ψ〉|↑˜〉 = cos θ
2
g(θ, φ)|0〉|0˜〉+ cos θ
2
h(θ, φ)|0〉|1˜〉 (27)
+ sin
θ
2
eiφg(θ, φ)|1〉|0˜〉+ sin θ
2
eiφh(θ, φ)|1〉|1˜〉 .
W.l.o.g. we assume it is superposition of |M1〉 and |M3〉,
imposing the relations
cot
θ
2
e−iφ
g
h
=
α
β
, cot
θ
2
e−iφ
h
g
=
γ
δ
. (28)
Similarly we expand |ψ¯〉|↓˜〉
|ψ¯〉|↓˜〉 = sin θ
2
h∗(θ, φ)|0〉|0˜〉 − sin θ
2
g∗(θ, φ)|0〉|1˜〉 (29)
− cos θ
2
eiφh∗(θ, φ)|1〉|0˜〉+ cos θ
2
eiφg∗(θ, φ)|1〉|1˜〉 .
It has to be superposition of either |M1〉 and |M3〉 or
|M2〉 and |M4〉, otherwise unphysical result 〈ψ↑˜|ψ¯↓˜〉 6= 0
is yielded.
We first consider |ψ¯↓˜〉 is a superposition of |M2〉 and
|M4〉. The following relations has to be satisfied
cot θe−iφ
g
h
= −α
β
, cot θe−iφ
h
g
= −γ
δ
. (30)
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Together with Eq. (29), α, δ, g(θ, φ) ought to be zero.
This implies B2 always sends |0˜〉 and |1˜〉 to B1, and the
basis of B1 measurement is four untangled states, i.e.
two single qubit measurement. It can be readily seen
that both |ψ〉|0˜〉 and |ψ¯〉|0˜〉 contain component of |M2〉,
hence the cheaters cannot distinguish |ψ〉 and |ψ¯〉 after
communication.
Now we consider |ψ¯↓˜〉 is a superposition of |M1〉 and
|M3〉, imposing the relations
tan
θ
2
e−iφ
h∗
g∗
=
α
β
, tan
θ
2
e−iφ
g∗
h∗
=
γ
δ
. (31)
Together with Eq. (29), we have
|g|2
|h|2 = tan
2 θ
2
,
|h|2
|g|2 = tan
2 θ
2
, (32)
which can only be satisfied for θ = π/2 but not for general
θ. We therefore conclude that our protocol is unbreakable
no matter what 2-qubit state is shared among cheaters,
and what strategy the cheaters employ. We would like
to comment on the case of θ = π/2 case, it means that
the basis for encoding are perpendicular in the Bloch’s
sphere. There are only three mutually perpendicular di-
rections in the Bloch’s sphere, which can be regarded as
the X , Y and Z directions. It explains why our cheating
works for and only for states encoded in eigenstates of
Pauli X , Y , Z operators.
In the case with N > 2 reference stations, we can prove
by contradiction that our scheme is secure for any N -
qubit states is shared by the cheaters and any strategy
they take. Let the maximum mutual distance between
reference stations is 2d, we call the two maximally sepa-
rated reference stations V1 and V2. Assume P lies in the
middle such that the minimum time required for PBQC
scheme is t = 2d/c. Suppose the restricted area of P is so
large that theN cheaters have to sit very close to each ref-
erence stations. The minimum time required for informa-
tion exchange among cheaters is t = 2d/c. If there exists
a strategy to cheat successfully for any θ, φ, and any Ui
distributed to Vi. Consider the case that U3, . . . , UN are
identity operators, in other words the basis information is
contained in U2 only. After measurement of B3, . . . , BN ,
the situation reduces to the one dimensional case, which
cannot be cheated as proved above. Therefore perfectly
successful strategy for N > 2 reference stations case does
not exist.
In general, the cheaters can share more complicated
quantum resources than entangled qubits. If two qubits
belonging to an entangled network, such as a 2D clus-
ter state, are possessed by each cheaters, it has to be
treated as an entangled four-level system which is not
covered in our proof. A PBQC protocol is uncondi-
tional secure if and only if cheating cannot succeed with
certainty no matter what entangled resources is shared
among cheaters, and what strategy they take. We pro-
vide in Appendix A the proof that our protocol is still
secure if entangled three-level system is shared among
cheaters. We believe our protocol is still secure in gen-
eral, because B2’s measurement on high-level entangled
system should produce more random outcomes, which is
not beneficial to cheating. But we cannot prove it ana-
lytically right now and leave it as an open question.
VIII. SUMMARY
We have shown how entangled resources can help
cheating the two proposed PBQC protocols. The idea
is to use teleportation, quantum secret sharing or CSQC
to share part of quantum information among cheaters,
whereby measurement can be conducted before all infor-
mation is known. Subsequent exchange of classical in-
formation amends the result to compensate the random
measurement outcomes of entangled resources.
Our cheating scheme is successful because random
byproducts of teleportation, quantum secret sharing or
CSQC, are Pauli operators. They do not map any code
state out of the code space. The loophole can be fixed by
using non-Clifford states to encode the message. Based
on this idea, we propose a modified version of Protocol
A which the code space spans the Bloch’s sphere. Our
protocol is proved to be secure if each cheater share en-
tangled qubits or qutrit (such as particle composites with
effective spin 1). The highest average successful rate of
cheating our protocol is 75% if no entangled resource is
used, and 85% if our cheating scheme is employed.
After the completion and circulation of a preliminary
version of the current paper, we have learnt of a preprint
by Buhrman et al. [25], which claims that, for a rather
general class of protocols, if cheaters possess unlimited
amount of entanglement, then all PBQC protocols are
insecure. If their argument is correct, then it will be in-
teresting to know whether PBQC protocols remains se-
cure if the cheaters only share finite amount of entan-
glement, which is more realistic, and what the minimum
amount of entanglement is required to cheat a PBQC
scheme perfectly. Another intriguing question is whether
PBQC is still feasible if some secret is shared by autho-
rized receiver and reference stations, instead of commu-
nicating all information through public channels. Very
recently, Kent [26] has proposed a PBQC scheme that
is claimed to be secure, provided that P and reference
stations agree with a sequence of bits that cannot be ob-
tained by cheaters. Besides, Malaney has also considered
a protocol that entangled pairs are beforehand shared
among P and reference stations [20].
Finally, we have assumed in the above consideration
that all operations are performed extremely fast compar-
ing to the traveling time of signals. To verify the possi-
bility of PBQC in practice, we consider the distance be-
tween reference stations is at the order of 100km, and the
size of restricted area of P is order of km. A round trip of
signals takes around 100 µs, and the presence of cheating
will give a deviation for about 1% of time, which is µs
scale. Consider recent experiments on optical quantum
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computation are operating on nanosecond scales [27], the
assumption of fast operation is still valid.
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Appendix A: Security of shared 3-level system
Here we outline the proof of security of our protocol
if an entangled three-level system is shared among two
cheaters in one dimensional case. This guarantee the
security in cases involving N > 2 reference stations, of
which the one dimensional case can always be regarded
as a special case, as claimed in the Section VII.
First of all, we investigate the properties of the en-
tangled n-level system if the cheating is successful with
certainty. We again assume B2 can make a measurement
such that B1 will receive one of n orthogonal states with
equal probability. The choice of orthogonal states incor-
porate information about the basis of encoded qubit. If
the encoded qubit is an eigenstate of Z, we let B1 will
receive a states belonging to {|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉}. Define a
vector (|~φ〉) ≡ (|φ1〉 . . . |φn〉)T , such that if the encoded
qubit is an eigenstate of nˆ(θ, φ) ·~σ, B1 will receive an ele-
ment of the vector Tˆ (θ, φ)(|~φ〉), where Tˆ (θ, φ) is an n×n
unitary matrix freely chosen by B2.
Let the basis of B1’s measurement operator is
{|M1〉, . . . , |Mn〉}. In order to distinguish the identity
of encoded qubit after exchanging information with B2,
each state |Mi〉 should not contain components of both
|φj〉|0〉 and |φj〉|1〉 for any j. Define a selection matrix
S(i) which is an diagonal matrix with eigenvalues 1 and
0 only, such that S
(i)
j j = 1 if |Mi〉 contains component
of |φj〉|0〉; while S(i)j j = 0 if |Mi〉 contains component of
|φj〉|1〉. The states |Mi〉 can be written as
|Mi〉 =
∑
j,j′
(
αij′S
(i)
j′j |φj〉|0〉+ αij′ (I − S(i)j′j)|φj〉|1〉
)
,
(A1)
where |αi1|2 + . . . + |αin|2 = 1; I is the n × n identity
matrix. Since B1 knows nothing about the basis, his
measurement is always the same. Similar to the argu-
ment above, if B1 is able to distinguish |ψ〉 and |ψ¯〉 after
information exchange, |Mi〉 has to be
|Mi〉 =
∑
k,k′,j
(
βikS˜
(i)
kk′ Tˆk′j |φj〉|ψ〉
+βik(I − S˜(i)kk′ )Tˆk′j |φj〉|ψ¯〉
)
, (A2)
where |βi1|2+ . . .+ |βin|2 = 1; S˜(i) are selection matrices.
Comparing Eq.s (A1) and (A2), we get
αij [cos
θ
2
S
(i)
jj + sin
θ
2
eiφ(I − S(i)jj )] = βikS˜(i)kk Tˆkj (A3)
αij [sin
θ
2
S
(i)
jj − cos
θ
2
eiφ(I − S(i)jj )] = βik(I − S˜(i)kk )Tˆkj .
(A4)
Summing the above two relations, and taking the scalar
product of themselves, we have∑
j
αij [(1 + sin θ)S
(i)
jj + (1− sin θ)(I − S(i)jj )]α∗ij
=
∑
k
βikβ
∗
ik = 1 , (A5)
where we have made use of the identities S2 = S, (I −
S)2 = (I−S), S(I−S) = 0. For sin θ 6= 0, above equation
together with normalization of |Mi〉 imposes
∑
j
αijS
(i)
jj α
∗
ij =
∑
j
αij(I − S(i)jj )α∗ij =
1
2
. (A6)
This is an important relation to restrict the kind of mea-
surement conducted by B1. It is to say that if cheating
is successful, the absolute square sum of coefficients as-
sociated with |0〉 of any state |Mi〉 has to be 12 .
Here we show that a complete set of states sat-
isfying Eq. (A6) does not exist in the entangled
three-level system case. Assume |M1〉 consists of
{|0〉|φ1〉, |0〉|φ2〉, |1〉|φ3〉} with non-zero contribution.
Other |M〉 cannot be formed by combination with two
|0〉 and one |1〉, otherwise the inner product with |M1〉
is non-zero, unless coefficient of one |0〉 is zero. We ig-
nore this case for a while and assume other |M〉’s has to
be formed by one |0〉 and two |1〉. Consider |M2〉 share
two common components as |M1〉, for example it contains
{|0〉|φ1〉, |1〉|φ2〉, |1〉|φ3〉}. By completeness relation of the
measurement states, there must be a state |M3〉 contains
|1〉|φ1〉. But there is no state containing |1〉|φ1〉 can both
orthogonal to |M1〉, |M2〉 and satisfy Eq. (A6). So |M2〉
must contain {|1〉|φ1〉, |1〉|φ2〉, |0〉|φ3〉}. Since there are
totally six orthogonal states, at least three of them must
share the same set of components.
Consider |M1〉, |M3〉, |M5〉 contain the terms
{|0〉|φ1〉, |0〉|φ2〉, |1〉|φ3〉}. As they have to satisfy
Eq. (A6), they can be expressed as
|Mi〉 = 1√
2
(
cos θi|0〉|φ1〉+ sin θieiµi |0〉|φ2〉+ eiνi |1〉|φ3〉
)
.
(A7)
Since the three states are orthogonal, we require
cos θi cos θj + sin θi sin θje
i(µi−µj) = −ei(νi−νj) , (A8)
for i 6= j. The term on the right hand side has norm 1,
which imposes constraints on left hand side such that
|M3〉 = 1√
2
(
cos θ1|0〉|φ1〉+ sin θ1eiµ1 |0〉|φ2〉 − eiν1 |1〉|φ3〉
)
.
(A9)
But one cannot find (θ5, µ5, ν5) that |M5〉 is orthogonal
to |M1〉 and |M3〉. So there does not exist three states
sharing the same components of states. We now return
to the case that some |Mi〉 contains only two |0〉 and one
|1〉 with coefficient of one |0〉 is zero. As the coefficient
is zero, it is no different to treat the component as |1〉, it
will then fall into paradigm of our proof.
We have assumed in the above argument that at least
one state is a superposition of three components, we now
consider all states contain only two components. We find
the only possible choice of states is
|M1,2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|φ1〉 ± eiµ1 |1〉|φ2〉) (A10)
=
1√
2
|ψ〉
(
cos
θ
2
|φ1〉 ± sin θ
2
ei(µ1−φ)|φ2〉
)
+
1√
2
|ψ¯〉
(
sin
θ
2
|φ1〉 ∓ cos θ
2
ei(µ1−φ)|φ2〉
)
|M3,4〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|φ2〉 ± eiµ2 |1〉|φ3〉) (A11)
=
1√
2
|ψ〉
(
cos
θ
2
|φ2〉 ± sin θ
2
ei(µ2−φ)|φ3〉
)
+
1√
2
|ψ¯〉
(
sin
θ
2
|φ2〉 ∓ cos θ
2
ei(µ2−φ)|φ3〉
)
|M5,6〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|φ3〉 ± eiµ3 |1〉|φ1〉) (A12)
=
1√
2
|ψ〉
(
cos
θ
2
|φ3〉 ± sin θ
2
ei(µ3−φ)|φ1〉
)
+
1√
2
|ψ¯〉
(
sin
θ
2
|φ3〉 ∓ cos θ
2
ei(µ3−φ)|φ1〉
)
,
or some cyclic permutation of |φ〉. On the other hand,
because we have proved |M〉 cannot contains three com-
ponents, each |Mi〉 should be written as,
|M1,2〉 = 1√
2
(
|ψ〉(Tˆ1i|φi〉)± eiν1 |ψ¯〉(Tˆ2i|φi〉)
)
(A13)
|M3,4〉 = 1√
2
(
|ψ〉(Tˆ2i|φi〉)± eiν1 |ψ¯〉(Tˆ3i|φi〉)
)
(A14)
|M5,6〉 = 1√
2
(
|ψ〉(Tˆ3i|φi〉)± eiν1 |ψ¯〉(Tˆ1i|φi〉)
)
.(A15)
When comparing the state associated with |ψ〉 in |M1〉
and |M3〉, it is clear that the expressions in Eq. (A10)-
(A12) and Eq. (A13)-(A15) cannot be equivalent. There-
fore, we now can claim that B1 cannot find a measure-
ment such that the state |ψ〉 and |ψ¯〉 after exchanging
information with B2, no matter what set of 3-level states
is transmitted by B2 through the entangled resources,
which proves security of our protocol in this case.
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